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Some Problems in Hearsay and
Relevancy In Missouri
There is no rule better known than that hearsay evidence is
generally not admissible. It is equally true, tho not so widely
known, that there are a large number of specific exceptions to
this general rule of exclusion. Hearsay, has been so long under
the ban that the profession not uncommonly thinks of it as not
being evidence at all, rather than as a kind of evidence generally
excluded for reasons of policy connected with the jury trial.
This notion is responsible for a good deal of confusion in
dealing with the exceptions under which hearsay is received. Instead of frankly dealing with the problem on the basis of a recognized exception to the hearsay rule, there is a constant tendency
to conclude that because certain evidence having all the earmarks of hearsay is actually received, it can not be hearsay, and
to distinguish it from hearsay by such phrases as "verbal acts"
and "res gestae."
Under this confused process courts frequently seem to think
that it is sufficient to determine that given matter is hearsay without considering the exceptions, thus unduly limiting the legitimate
use of hearsay. In other fields the "verbal act" phrase has been
invoked to admit hearsay that can not be classified under any
known exception.
It must be remembered that the term "res gestae" is used in
many different senses, and that to settle that spoken or written
words are a part of the res gestae does not in the least determine
whether we are dealing with hearsay or not. For example, A
calls B a liar who promptly knocks him down. These words are
relevant and admissible as explaining the cause of the assault.
To call them a part of the res gestae means no more than that, for
there is obviously no question of hearsay involved. We are not
trying to prove that B is a liar, but merely what provoked him
to make the assault. If in the progress of the fight A should
(3)
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cry out, "He is choking me," this would also be admitted, and
probably with the explanation that it was a part of the res gestae.
Here the court is admitting hearsay because we are trying to
prove that B did choke A by A's unsworn, un-crossexamined assertion to that effect. This hearsay assertion is receivable because there is an exception to the hearsay rule covering that sort of
an assertion when made under the conditions supposed. The same
confusion is involved in the "verbal act" phrase. The speaking
of any words is of course an act, involving mental and physical
action-a verbal act. Since all speaking is a verbal act it is not
very helpful to use such a term to explain two very different situations, viz., the admission of words where no question of hearsay
is involved, and the admission of words amounting to an assertion under some exception to the hearsay rule.
For example, if it were important to prove that A was unfriendly to B, no one would doubt that proof that A professed
friendship for B, and at the same time circulated damaging reports about him which he knew to be false, would be good evidence for the purpose. Here no problem of hearsay is involved.
We are not taking A's assertions as true, but are arguing from
the falsity and inconsistency to the probable motives or feelings
which prompted them. If, however, A used words which amounted to an assertion of his hate for B, we are immediately confronted with the hearsay rule, and hence must find an appropriate exception. Nothing but confusion is gained to call this a verbal
act, for that will not help to differentiate this particular piece of
hearsay from the general mass of inadmissible hearsay.
Another source of confusion is the frequent failure to separate certain problems of relevancy from the hearsay rule and
its exceptions. To illustrate: a party may seek to prove fact
X as tending to establish fact Y, and may offer to prove X by
hearsay claimed to come under a well settled exception. Here
are two distinct questions: is X sufficiently relevant to Y to be
proved at all, and if so, is the offered hearsay a permissible means
of proving X? Yet it is not uncommon to find these two questions discussed to the confusion of both, as if the question were
simply whether hearsay was admissible to prove Y.
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With this brief introduction it is now proposed to consider
the somewhat confused and inconsistent treatment of three very
similar problems in hearsay and relevancy by the Supreme Court
of Missouri: first, on the issue of self-defense, the proof of
threats by the deceased as tending to show that he was the aggressor; second, the proof of threats of suicide by the deceased
as tending to disprove the charge of murder; third, the proof of
threats by a third person as tending to show that such person committed the crime rather than the defendant.
The argument involved in each situation is the same, namely:
A threatened to assault B, and therefore he probably intended to
do so. A fight took place between A and B, and therefore it is
probable that A was carrying out his intention. S threatened
to kill himself, and therefore he probably intended to do so.
S died from wounds which be might have inflicted himself, and
therefore it is probable that he carried out his intention. T threatened to burn J's house, and therefore he probably intended to do
so; the house was burned when T might have done it, and therefore it is probable that he carried out his intention.
Is such an argument permissible in a court of law? It cannot be claimed that the known intention of X to bring a given
result to pass, whether innocent or harmful, would be a sufficient
basis per se for a conclusion that be carried out his intention.
Experience shows no such uniform connection between intention
and conduct. But in connection with other facts, such as opportunity and ability to produce the result, intention becomes an important factor in determining the author.
As applied to a defendant, it was never doubted that intention was a relevant and important fact, in determining whether he
did a given act. And if a defendant's intention is relevant as bearing on his probable conduct, the intention of a third person under
similar conditions must be equally relevant as bearing on his probable conduct, unless we are to have one system of logic for a defendant, and a totally different one for third persons. In order to
argue that either a defendant or a third person was probably
carrying out his intention, such intention must, of course, have
existed at the time of the act sought to be established. Normally
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this is impossible to prove directly; from the nature of a situation we can only argue that a known prior intention continued
to the time in question. Within what limits this is permissible
can not be defined, because no two cases are precisely alike. An
intention to commit a simple assault and battery because of some
slight provocation might not continue an hour; an intention to
kill another because of a real or fancied grievance might well continue for months. As against defendants the original, rule appeared to be that the intention must be shown to have existed
close enough in point of time to warrant a reasonable inference
of continuance under all the circumstances. Certainly no stricter
rule should be applied to the case of a third party. And in fact
there is a good deal to be said in favor of applying a more liberal
time rule in the latter case. In a criminal case a very high degree
of certainty is necessary to convict, and therefore prior intention
may well be excluded unless close enough in point of time under
the circumstances to raise a strong probability of continuance.
A defendant is entitled to an acquittal if there is a reasonable doubt of guilt, and hence proof tending to show the commission of the act by a third person might well be sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt, tho it would not have been sufficient
to convict such third person if he had been on trial. This view
does not appear to have been discussed in any of the cases, and
in some of them, because of a confused treatment of the res
gestae notion, a stricter rule seems to have been applied to the
intention of a third person, e. g. Foster v. Shepard.'
Assuming that the prior intention may be shown, there is no
difficulty about the means of proof in the case of a defendant;
because it is universally recognized that whatever he may have
said, whether circumstantially evidencing his intention, or directly
asserting it, is receivable as an admission. In the case of a third
person, declarations of intention are of course hearsay, i. e. unswon-, un-crossexamined assertions of a fact (intention) used
to prove the existence of the fact asserted, and must therefore
come in under some exception to the hearsay rule, if they are to
be admitted. The res gestae phrase has been most frequently
1.

(1919)

258 Ill. 164.
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invoked to the utter confusion of the subject, because it suggests
declarations connected with, and accompanying an act, so as to
2
be a part of the thing done.
In fact there is a much broader exception which ought to be
well understood, at this time, and that is that whenever a state of
mind is a relevant fact, contemporaneous assertions of such state
of mind are receivable to prove it. In Doe v. Palmer,3 the rule
as applied to the intention of a testator was thus stated by Lord
Chief Justice Campbell: "In all cases where there is any imputation of fraud in the making of the will, the declarations of
the testator are admitted respecting his dislike or affection for his
relations, or those who appear in the will to be the objects of his
bounty, and respecting his intentions either to benefit them or to
pass them by in the disposition of his property."
And in Sugden v. St. Leonards,4 also a will case involving
the intention of the testator as a relevant fact, Lord Justice Mellish
thus stated the rule and the reason: "Whenever it is material
to prove the state of a person's mind, or what was passing in it,
and what were his intentions, there you may prove what he said,
because that is the only means by which we can find out what
his intentions were."
In the United States the exception was most clearly recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in Mutual Life
Insurance Company v. Hillmon.5 The issue was as to the identity of a dead body; a man had been killed in an accident; the
plaintiff claimed that the dead man was the insured, Hillmon;
the defendant claimed that the dead man was one Walter, a
stranger; in connection with other evidence tending to identify
Walter as the dead man, the defendant, in order to show the probability of Walter's being present at the time, offered letters written
by him several weeks before expressing his intention of going to
that part of the country with Hillmon. ° The letters were rejected
by the trial judge on the hearsay. objection. In holding that the
2. For an extreme application of this notion, see Greenacre v.

Filby (Il1. 1916) 114 N. E. 536.
3. (1851) 16 Q. B. 747.
4. (1876) 1 Prob. Div. 154.
&. (1892) 145 U. S.285.
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letters should have been admitted, Mr. Justice Gray said: "But
upon another ground suggested they (the letters) should have
been admitted. -A man's state of mind or feelings can only be
manifested to others by countenance, attitude or gesture, or by
sounds or words, spoken or written. The nature of the fact is
the same, and evidence of its proper tokens is equally competent
to prove it, whether expressd by aspect or conduct, by voice or
pen. When the intention to be proved is important only as
qualifying an act, its connection with the act must be shown, in
order to warrant the admission of declarations of intention. But
whenever the intention is of itself a distinct and material fact
in a chain of circumstances, it may be proved by contemporaneous
oral or written declarations of the party. The existence of a
particular intention in a certain person at a certain time being a
material fact to be proved, evidence that he expressed that intention at that time is as direct evidence of the fact, as his own
testimony that he then had that intention would be. Afer his
death there can hardly be any other way of proving it."
On this basis, the three situations considered, declarations
of intention by the deceased to attack the defendant, declarations
of intention by the deceased to commit suicide and declarations of
intention by a third person to commit the crime in question,
should be governed by exactly the same rule. In each case the
declarations of intention are receivable under an exception to the
hearsay rule to prove the intention then asserted. But if the intention at the time of the declaration is too remote or otherwise
not relevant, then such declarations are excluded, not because
of the hearsay rule, but because the thing they tend to prove, i. e.
intention at that time, is not to be proved at all.
Turning to the decisions in Missouri, it appears that the question of uncommunicated threats came up in the early case of McMillen v. State." An offer was made to show a recent threat by
the deceased to shoot the defendant. In approving the rejection
of this evidence, Judge Napton said: "As Jackson Logsdon" (the
deceased) "was not a party to the prosecution, what he said is no
more than the hearsay of any other man, and was therefore upon
6.

(1850)

13 Mo. 30.
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general principles inadmissible. Had his declarations been in
articulo mortis or a part of the res gestae, they would have come
within the exception to the general rule ......... The bill of exceptions does not show when the declarations were made. Recently is a word of indefinite character." The res gestae time
limit applicable to declarations of things made under the stress of
an exciting event, etc. is here misapplied to declarations of intention.
The same notion can be traced in the next case of State v.
Jackson.7 There the threat was properly excluded because, according to the defendant's own version of the difficulty, the
deceased was not attempting to carry out his threats, and there
was no question of self-defense, but the Supreme Court announced
the strange doctrine that threats were not admissible if sufficient
time had elapsed for the blood to cool. As no such limitation
has ever been suggested in case of threats by the defendant, the
court was evidently influenced by this notion of res g estae-declarations accompanying an act. In State v. Hays,8 the offer was
to prove communicated threats, but the opinion fails to distinguish the situation, and again puts undue stress on the time element, nearness to this difficulty.
The question came up again in State v. Sloan, where the
offer was to show repeated threats down to the day of the difficulty. The Supreme Court held that they should have been admitted, saying: "The threats were continuous and frequent;
they were all blended and inseparable; and the last threat, when
the deceased had his revolver with him, showing an ability to
carry out and accomplish his purpose, went to form a part of the
res gestae, and must be considered as of the same transaction.
They were therefore all admissible ...... to show whether the
defendant acted in necessary self-defense."
Here the court
thought that the connection was sufficient to bring them within
the elastic res gestae doctrine.
7.
8.
9.

(1853) 17 Mo. 544.
(1856) 23 Mo. 287.
(1871) 47 Mo. 604.
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When the question came up again in State v. Elkins,10 the
time element was put on the proper basis. Judge Wagner there
said: "When threats by the person killed should be admitted
in evidence or rejected is a question involved in a great deal of
doubt and uncertainty. If they have been made a long time
antecedent to the commission of the act, they may be not only
valueless, but entirely inadmissible. The relations of the parties
may have since entirely changed, and in the intervening time the
person making them may have wholly abandoned any previously
conceived intention of harming the person against whom they,
were uttered ....... Their relevancy, admission or rejection depends materially upon the circumstances surrounding each particular case." Here appears to be a tacit recognition that there
is an exception to the hearsay rule, distinct from any doctrine of
res gestae, under which threats are admissible to prove intention
at the time of making such threats, and clearly that the relevancy
of such prior intention as tending to show that the deceased was
the aggressor depends upon the time and circumstances from
which it may fairly be inferred that such intention continued.
The later cases add nothing to the Elkins case which may be
taken as settling the rule. But in the case of State v. Wright,"'
approved in State v. Porter,12 it was ruled that in case of threats
by the defendant, remoteness does not affect the competency, but
goes only to the weight of the evidence. This would seem to go
too far against a defendant, and in any event the rule ought not
to be more liberal than in case of threats by the deceased.. This
last proposition appears to be conceded by the opinion in State v.
3

Wilson.1

The question of the admissibility of threats of suicide appears
to have arisen for the first time in State v. Punshon.'4 The delfendant was tried for the murder of his wife by shooting. The
claim of the defence was that she killed herself, and the defendant
so testified. The parties had quarrelled and were alone in a car10.

(1876) 63 Mo. 159.

11.
12.

(1897) 141 Mo. 333, 42 S. W. 934.
(1908) 213 Mo. 43, 111 S. W. 529.

13.
14.

(1913) 250 Mo. 323, 157 S. W. 313.
(1894) 124 Mo. 448, 27 S. W. 1111.
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riage at the time. The circumstances were strongly against the
defendant, and yet if the jury had believed that Mrs. Punshon
really intended suicide, they might in view of that fact have credited Punshon's story, or at least have had serious doubts of his
guilt. The defendant offered evidence of repeated threats of suicide because of their marital difficulties. This offer was excluded,
and the defendant convicted. On appeal, Judge Burgess approved
the ruling, saying: "The statements of the wife were not part
of the res gestae as exclamations of pain, nor were they in respect
to her health, and were properly excluded; and so were her statements that she intended to kill herself, for the same reason. She
was not a party to the prosecution and the state was not bound
by anything she may have said."15 It is interesting to see the exploded McMillen case invoked to sustain the ruling, without noticing the long line of cases overruling it through the last forty years.
The Punshon case was reversed on other grounds, and on the second appeal the decision on this point was adhered to without comment.' 0 .
In State v. Fitzgerald,'7 the defendant testified that the deceased shot herself, and the trial court admitted threats of suicide. Hence on the defendant's appeal this question was not before
the court, but the same judge took occasion to review a number of
cases, and concluded: "Such statements are only admissible in a
criminal case when part of the res gestae, or when they are admissible as dying declarations. This we think not only supported by
the decided weight of authority, but by reason as well."' I s Curiously enough the court entirely overlooked the cases of threats by
the deceased, which ought to have settled the rule for this situation.
In State v. Bauerle,19 the Punshon and Fitzgerald cases were
followed without discussion, tho again the overruled McMillen
case was cited. Finally in State v. Ilgenfritz,2 0 the question was
again examined by Commissioner Williams and the correct con15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Citing, McMillen v. State (1850)13 Mo. 30.
State v. Punshon (1896) 133 Mo. 44, 34 S. W. 25.
(1895) 130 Mo. 407, 32 S. W. 1113.
Citing, State v. Punshon (1894) 124 Mo. 448, 27 S. W. 1111.
(1898) 145 Mo. 1, 46 S. W. 609.
(1914) 263 Mo. 615, 173 S. W. 1041.
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clusion reached.that threats of suicide should have been admitted,
thus reaching the same result that had been worked out at least
fifty years earlier in the first class of cases. It is unfortunate,
however, that the learned Commissioner should have undertaken
to distinguish such threats from hearsay by calling them "verbal
acts." If the term "verbal acts" must be retained, it ought to be
limited to cases which do not involve a hearsay use of words,
where the words do not amount to an assertion of the fact to be
established, but furnish only circumstantial evidence of it. For
example, on the issue of sanity the assertion by the alleged lunatic
that he was the Emperor Napoleon would be merely circumstan"
tial evidence of a disordered mind. Certain profane expletives
might in like manner, evidence annoyance or temper. And so certain false assertions might circumstantially evidence a particular
intention. Such things might be called verbal acts to distinguish
them from hearsay. But confusion is bound to result from a failure to recognize that declarations of intention or of any other mental state, are hearsay, but nevertheless admissible as an exception
because of necessity.
The question of threats by a third person to commit the act
with which the defendant is charged does not appear to have
come before the Supreme Court until the case of State v. Crawford.21 At the trial of the defendant on a charge of arson, evidence of threats by a third person against the property of the
prosecuting witness was offered and excluded. From the brief
report it is impossible to tell what sort of threats were proposed
to be proved, or when they were made, or whethe- there was any
other evidence to connect such person with the offense. The Supreme Court approved the ruling below on the ground that such
threats were res inter alios, and had no bearing on the guilt of
the accused. It is therefore impossible to say what this case
stands for.
The same question arose again in State v- Taylor.22 The
defendant was charged with burglary in breaking and entering a
country store early in the morning; his claim was that he found
21.
22.

(1889) 99 Mo. 74, 12 S. W. 354.
(1896) 136 Mo. 66, 27 S. W. 907.
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the door open and went in expecting to find some one in charge.
Evidence of threats by a third person was excluded. Judge Sherwood approved the ruling, saying: "The offer of defendant to
prove that Jim Baker, the blacksmith, had made a key which
would fit and unlock the store in question, and that he intended
to burglarize it, was properly rejected. Mere threats by third
persons to commit the crime charged against the accused, or the
confessions of such persons in open court that they committed
the crime, is wholly inadmissible in defense of the party on trial,
because such matters are purely hearsay." The court added that
if some overt act on the part of Baker had been proved, or if he
had been shown to have been in the immediate vicinity at the
time, a different ruling might have been proper. The reason given
by the court that the threats were hearsay, while true in fact,
furnished no objection in law, because of the exception for declarations of intention. They are not to be classed, as the court
did, with subsequent confessions which are narratives of past
transactions, and for which there is no hearsay exception. If
the threats were properly excluded, it was not because they were
hearsay, but because there were not sufficient other facts to warrant any inference that Baker had broken into the store.
On the latter proposition it would seem that enough had
been shown to admit the threats, because it surely can not be
necessary to make such a showing as would convict the third person-a less degree of certainty than that might properly raise
a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. The question arose
a third time in State v. Barrington.23 The defendant was convicted of murder on strong circumstantial evidence. His own account of the affair was that he accompanied; the deceased out into
the country at night to meet some strangers on business; that a
dispute arose and these strangers shot the deceased. Defendant
offered to prove that deceased was engaged in a swindling business
in which he made a number of enemies who had threatened him
with violence. This evidence was excluded. The Supreme Court
affirmed the ruling, without any particular discussion, on the authority of the Crawford case and the Taylor case, quoting the fore23.

(1906)

198 Mo. 23, 95 S. W. 235.
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going excerpts from the two opinions. The court also cited a case
from West Virginia, 2 4 and one from Wisconsin, 25 in each of
which it was broadly announced that threats by third persons were
not admissible because they had no bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The Barrington case therefore leaves the question in confusion. The same reason that excepts threats of the deceased from
the hearsay rule on the question of self-defense or suicide, is
equally applicable to threats by a third person. Such a state of
facts as would make the prior intention of the defendant to commit the act a relevant fact, must equally make the intention of a
third person relevant.
The Barrington case may possibly be supported on the ground
that there was no evidence to connect the threats offered to be
proved with the strangers who were claimed to have done the
shooting, tho it is certainly arguable that the fact that some unknown person had a grudge against the deceased and the intention of injuring him would tend to corroborate the defendant's
testimony as to the attack of strangers.
The author is not aware of any later case in this state dealing with this question. Hence the problem of threats by third
persons remains to be settled, when the question arises, on the
reason and analogies furnished by other cases of declarations of
intention.
E. W. HINTON 2 6
University of Chicago Law School
24. Grookham v. State (1871) 5 W. Va. 510.
25. Buel v. State (1899) 104 Wis. 132.
26. Formerly Professor of Law, and Dean of the Schoolof Law,
University of Missouri.

